Do public opinion dynamics play an important role in understanding conflict trajectories between democratic governments and other rival groups? The authors interpret several theories of opinion dynamics as competing clusters of contemporaneous causal links connoting reciprocity, accountability, and credibility. They translate these clusters into four distinct Bayesian structural time series models fit to events data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with variables for U.S. intervention and Jewish public opinion about prospects for peace. A credibility model, allowing Jewish public opinion to influence U.S., Palestinian, and Israeli behavior within a given month, fits best. More pacific Israeli opinion leads to more immediate Palestinian hostility toward Israelis. This response's direction suggests a negative feedback mechanism in which low-level conflict is maintained and momentum toward either all-out war or dramatic peace is slowed. In addition, a forecasting model including Jewish public opinion is shown to forecast ex ante better than a model without this variable.
Introduction
Much progress has been made recently in the analysis of conflict processes. Reciprocal behaviors, seen in the Balkans and Middle East, it is argued, are the bases for cooperation and peace. The same is true for the triangular relationships found in these and other conflicts. Third-party intervention in conflicts, especially by great powers, can promote cooperation and peace. What has not been studied is how and when public opinion affects conflicts. Does public opinion discourage or encourage local leaders to reciprocate a rival's behavior? Do local publics monitor international conflicts and hold leaders accountable for policies that do not match public preferences? Do leaders use public opinion in a rival to gauge the credibility of signals they receive from those adversaries? We will not understand how conflict depends on domestic politics, including democratic politics, until we focus on this interplay between the domestic and international arenas. Until now, answering these questions has been difficult for several reasons. First, domestic politics is embedded in the conflict system. This is a system of multiple relationships (equations) between the behaviors of several governments. Any model purporting to capture domestic politics must be of moderate to large scale. Endogeneity is a second problem. Political accountability, if it exists, implies that opinion formation and expression are both a cause and a consequence of government policy. Reciprocity and triangularity imply endogeneity as well. Models that impose strong exogeneity restrictions therefore may produce results that are biased. Finally, any link between conflict and domestic political dynamics is likely to exist at a subannual level of aggregation. Public opinion likely reacts quickly to hostile actions, and leaders may monitor these reactions and rapidly translate them into policies. We assess the impact of domestic politics on international and intergroup conflict in a way that solves these three problems. Reciprocity, accountability, and credibility are interpreted as particular causal links between governments' behaviors and public opinion. Expectations about these linkages are described and translated into a framework that captures competing claims about the structure of contemporaneous relationships among the measures of dyadic behavior and public opinion. These specifications can be contrasted with the common practice of using a recursive identification scheme that assumes one-way contemporaneous causality. Our competing specifications are key elements of multiequation, Bayesian time series models with complex, endogenous relationships among variables. These models are fit to data for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with provisions for U.S. intervention. This case is especially useful for testing the competing theories because the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) and other event databases provide temporally disaggregated records of the behaviors of the belligerents and of the United States. Equally important, the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC) regularly polls Israeli citizens about prospects for and impacts of peace initiatives. For the first time in a major conflict, the impact of public opinion on reciprocity, accountability, and credibility can be assessed.
supports asymmetric reciprocity between democratic and nondemocratic belligerents best fits the data. In this model, there is evidence that more bellicose Israeli opinion leads to more immediate cooperation by the Palestinians. This supports the credibility model since Palestinians account for changes in Jewish public opinion. The direction of this response suggests a negative feedback mechanism whereby low-level conflict is maintained and momentum toward all-out war or dramatic peace is slowed. Finally, to further demonstrate the importance of public opinion on conflict dynamics, we evaluate two reduced-form forecasting models. The first incorporates Jewish public opinion. It is used to forecast, ex ante, nine months forward from March 2005. The forecasts show a rapid deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations. These ex ante forecasts predict steadily deteriorating relations between the Israelis and Palestinians even if Kadima and Hamas had not won elections in that year. The risk of a significant increase in conflict is high. The alternative forecasting model omits the Jewish public opinion series. It performs much worse because it ignores the predictive impact of public opinion and thus accountability and credibility on the conflict dynamics.
2. Reciprocity, Accountability, and Credibility Figure 1 presents the possible relationships that may exist between leader behaviors in two rivals A and B where, as in our study, systematic public opinion information is available for only one rival. Below, we review various theoretical arguments about the linkages depicted in this diagram.
Reciprocity
One important branch of international relations research investigates the role of reciprocity in foreign policy. Building on Axelrod (1984) and repeated non-zero-sum games, many scholars have found that cooperative diplomacy from one actor (foreign policy behavior of A to B) begets cooperative diplomacy from the target (foreign policy behavior of B to A). This theoretical result suggests that cooperation can be built on bilateral strategies even when temporary incentives to defect exist. For instance, if one group has an opportunity to win disputed territory from another, it may choose not to attack since this could discourage cooperation in the future. The prevalence of these tit-for-tat strategies has been empirically identified in cold war relations, in triangular relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (Goldstein and Freeman 1990) , in Indian-Pakistani relations (Ward 1982) , in the Middle East (Goldstein et al. 2001) , and in the Balkans (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997) . Scholars have been able to show that similar action-reaction sequences exist in subnational conflicts (Moore 1998; Shellman, Reeves, and Stewart 2007) .
Extensions of the reciprocity literature relate bilateral cooperation to third-party intervention or mediation (Goldstein and Freeman 1990; Brandt and Freeman 2006; Hudson et al. 2006) . Goldstein et al. (2001) report that the United States was able to alter Iraqi behavior toward its neighbors and Israeli behavior toward the Palestinians in the 1980s. The modeling of these triangular relations has allowed reciprocityrelated research to not only focus on spirals of conflict and cooperation but also explain more complex multiactor situations.
Despite the strong evidence of reciprocity and action-reaction sequences in international affairs, there are at least three remaining issues. First, some tests of reciprocity miss the implications of endogeneity and lagged relationships. Two approaches have been employed. One, Granger causality analysis, is used in almost every empirical model that claims evidence for reciprocity and triangularity. This method looks at only the bivariate relationship between how past actions affect today's actions and ignores the endogeneity of multiple belligerents, third parties, and outside pressures (e.g., Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Goldstein et al. 2001) . A second approach looks at the contemporaneous and dynamic responses (i.e., the structural relationships) between belligerents. But most of these works employ a naive causal chain where the shocks to the equations for each actor enter the model in a prespecified, recursive order (e.g., Goldstein and Freeman 1990) . 3 This implies that a surprise action by one actor (A to B) can have a simultaneous impact on the Figure 1 A Roadmap of Two-way Streets: Reciprocity, Accountability, and Credibility behavior of another actor (B to A) but that the targeted actor's surprise action (B to A) behavior can influence only the first actor's behavior (A to B) with some prespecified time lag. The assumption is that no two variables in the model have contemporaneous, two-way causality within the period of analysis. While this set of assumptions may be useful in some applications and identification requirements must be met for estimation and interpretation in all models, we believe that there are no theoretical or practical reasons to assume conflict dynamics form a simple, one-way causal chain. Here, we offer an alternative, nonrecursive approach to reciprocity and other conflict dynamics. Finally, reciprocal behaviors may be asymmetric across groups, with one government or authority reacting more strongly than another (Ward 1982) . What explains this action-reaction mismatch? Since democratic leaders must pay attention to both foreign and domestic conditions for political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) , and rivals likely know this, public foreign policy support for cooperation and conflict may explain the variation in reciprocal behaviors, unilateral deviations, and dyadic asymmetry.
The Intersection of Domestic and World Politics
A branch of research extending reciprocity models explains conflict and cooperation as a function of domestic institutions and politics. Putnam (1988 ), Fearon (1994 ), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003 view world politics as a twolevel game where elites are accountable to foreign and domestic politics. Leaders must worry about whether their constituents support the agreements they negotiate with particular groups and with other countries. Within identifiable institutional contexts, citizens can hold leaders accountable for their foreign policy choices. Specifically, we view accountability as the linkage between public support in country A for cooperation with country B and foreign policy behavior of country A to B (see Figure 1) . Leaders who ignore their public's support for a policy toward a given group (country) may be voted out of office. A potential repercussion of this accountability process is that leaders who can generate high audience costs for their policies can more credibly communicate resolve in international conflict situations (Fearon 1994; Martin 2000) . Thus, some international relations forecasters argue that scenario generation must anticipate public opinion changes (Sylvan, Keller, and Haftel 2004; Sirriyeh 1995) .
Research on the causes of reciprocal behavior suggests that domestic preferences play an important role in explaining conflict. McGinnis and Williams (2001) aver citizens' preferences constrain leaders' tit-for-tat interactions. In their ''rivalry-as-prison'' or Goldilocks hypothesis, the public prefers conflicts to remain in some limited range of interactions. Policies that are too dramatic in either a cooperative or bellicose direction are domestically costly and may cause voters to remove incumbents. Under such constraints, leaders spend their time reciprocating each other's limited cooperative or bellicose policies. Guisinger and Smith (2002) and McGillivray and Smith (2000) hypothesize that in democracies the public prefers to pocket the gains that accrue from reciprocal cooperation rather than to defect for a one-time payoff that makes longterm cooperation impossible. For these reasons, the public is expected to punish a leader who does not engage in reciprocity, and thus the public constrains a leader's behavior and supports reciprocal outcomes. But this begs a question: can changes in the public's foreign policy preferences explain deviations from reciprocity? If so, then public preferences on foreign policy processes could aid forecasting and understanding of international conflict.
Counterclaims: A Flock of Followers
All scholarly voices do not sing the praises of domestic political explanations. Almond (1965) , Morgenthau (1967) , and Rosato (2003, 599) question the public's ability to comprehend, process, and intelligibly guide foreign policy. Because of knowledge and interest deficits between the public and foreign policy elites, it is hypothesized that leaders can manipulate citizens. These authors point to the rally-'round-the-flag effect as evidence that when a leader tells the public to jump, approval jumps. The public does not constrain the leader because it will rally to the leader's position. This follower model predicts that information on public preferences is not useful in understanding policy.
Evidence for the rally effect and public knowledge deficits is mixed. While there is some evidence that a rally-'round-the-flag effect exists in the United States and Britain, this does not mean that public preferences are meaningless in predicting international events in these cases. Colaresi (2007) shows that the rally varies considerably from crisis to crisis in ways that can be predicted from an accountabilitybased signaling model of foreign policy decision making. Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) , Page and Shapiro (1995) , and Holsti (1996) argue that public opinion is more stable and reasonable than skeptics credit. The empirical question remains: in foreign policy, who is the leader and who is the follower?
Challenging the public-as-follower model, Wlezien (1996) , Eichenberg and Stoll (2003) , and Baumgartner and Jones (2005) show that in many circumstances not only do leadership cues fail on defense issues but also the public reacts oppositely. When holding a priori public preferences constant, the public is likely to react to a bellicose policy change by pulling in the opposite direction, supporting more cooperation. This is identified by Baumgartner and Jones (2005) as a negative feedback mechanism and is consistent with the McGinnis and Williams's (2001) rivalry-as-prison effect. The public hems in policy rather than blindly following leadership cues.
There are competing claims about the effects of foreign policy change on public preferences in this follower model. The public-as-follower model suggests that the public is attracted to a leader's policy. A leader's shift to a more cooperative policy creates similar public preferences. Alternatively, the negative feedback mechanism of Baumgartner and Jones (2005) implies that the public will be repulsed by a change in policy. Instead of following a cooperative policy, people are likely to move in a bellicose direction and hold their leader accountable for his or her policies.
On the Other Side(s): Cross-level Credibility
Rivals and potential mediators may base their policies on the accountability dynamics of their adversary. Putnam (1988) , Fearon (1994) , and Martin (2000) suggest that leaders look across the water's edge to gauge the credibility of any bargaining strategies. An important component of Putnam's two-level game framework is that leader B will examine the public preferences constraining leader A to determine if an offer or action is a bluff. The greater the constraints on leader A from leader B's perspective (the farther the public preferences in country A are from leader B's ideal outcome), the greater the credibility of an uncompromising offer from leader A. If the relevant public is unsupportive of peace, regardless of the offers made by leader A, leader B does not have an incentive to offer extreme cooperation.
5 Even if the other side offered to reciprocate, it is unlikely that this cooperation would be ratified. For instance, Shlaim (2001) notes that Nasser avoided cooperative gestures toward Israel for fear of both his own public's negative reactions as well as the Israeli public's negative reactions. Conversely, as a public grows more supportive of collaboration, a peace-seeking rival may suggest greater cooperation since citizens are now more likely to support any agreement. This implies that there is a relationship between the foreign policy behavior of country B to A and public support in A for cooperation with B (see Figure 1) . 6 But the dynamics of credibility may not be unidirectional. Page and Shapiro (1995) and Holsti (1996) suggest that the public bases its support of or opposition to cooperation on available information, including a rival's actions. 
From Theory to Models: Problems and Solutions
In this section, the preceding arguments are organized into four models of international conflict, which are then applied to the Israeli-Palestinian case. The translation of these theories into testable models of conflict and cooperation is nontrivial. These models suggest a highly dynamic, endogenous, and large-scale data-generation process.
Reciprocity, triangularity, accountability, and credibility relationships imply that international actions and public preferences are dynamic. Previous changes in policy or preferences are likely to affect current changes in policy or preferences. These frameworks also suggest that current changes in many variables simultaneously affect others. If a leader is worried about political punishment for deviating from public preferences, a surprise change in those public preferences may lead to a simultaneous change in policy to bring conflict and cooperation into line with those preferences. Similarly, a watchful public might alter its opinion about a conflict immediately after witnessing a surprise change in a rival's policy toward its country. The temporally aggregated data used in many existing studies often masks this kind of public reaction (thus increasing the role of endogeneity). Finally, focusing on the directed-dyadic behavior of two rivals, allowing for great power intervention, and taking into account the possibility of accountability and credibility, produces a model that includes at least seven or more equations. Allowing lagged effects, the number of parameters in the model will grow exponentially as we add relevant actors and more equations.
To cope with these problems, the ideas described above are represented as four competing sets of relationships. Schematically, Figure 1 is translated into Table 1 . This table captures the possibility of different ''two-way'' interactions embodied in the concepts of reciprocity and credibility. The model of interactions assumes there is a separate behavior equation for each of the dyadic interactions between rivals. In the table, the foreign policies of actor A (B) toward actor B (A) is denoted by Policy A → B (Policy B → A ) and public opinion in the political jurisdiction of actor A as Public A . The column labeled Policy Z → A represents outside intervention by Z toward A. The rows are the behavioral relationships (equations) to be modeled for each of the four theories of rivalry and public interactions. The columns are the independent variables, the surprise changes or ''shocks'' in policy and opinion. A yes represents an expectation that the column variable will influence the row equation simultaneously, while a no indicates an expected zero restriction.
The first set of ideas, the bystander model, contends that the public plays no role in foreign policy. The public pays little attention to events. In this view, previous scholarship on reciprocity and triangular relationships is correct in ignoring public opinion in its empirical specifications. This thesis predicts that (1) a surprise change in conflict and cooperation either sent or received by one actor will have no systematic affect on public preferences and (2) a shift in the public's preferences will not lead to changes in the policies of its home government toward an adversary.
The second, follower model allows the public to follow but not lead foreign policy toward a rival, mirroring the logic of the patriotic rally-'round-the-flag literature. Public preferences react to government policy, but government policy does not react to changes in public preferences.
In the third, accountability model, the public not only reacts to foreign policy but also can lead that policy so government policy reacts to changes in public preferences. If public support of conflict or cooperation toward a rival changes, its government's policies reflect this in some way. This third perspective contends that the public is paying attention not only to what their government does (actor A) but also to what the rival (actor B) may be doing. Thus, there should be a bidirectional relationship between conflict (cooperation) and public opinion.
The final model incorporates the belief that if accountability relationships exist within one group (country), its rival is likely to use that information to formulate its own foreign policy toward that group (country). In this credibility model, public preferences in one rival are likely to affect the policies of its adversary toward that rival. If the public has relevant ratification power, as in the accountability model, that information is unlikely to be ignored by its adversary.
Another process relevant to both accountability and credibility is external thirdparty intervention (actor Z in Table 1 ). Following previous work on triangularity, localized conflicts are likely to react to great power interventions by encouraging or discouraging cooperation between the belligerents. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the public does not immediately react to the policies of foreign governments in the same way it reacts to the policies of its own government. On the other hand, the credibility model suggests that third parties are likely to take public opinion into account when calculating the expected costs and benefits of cooperation and conflict (Goldstein and Freeman 1990) .
It is important to note that theories of reciprocity, accountability, and credibility cannot be represented by a single equation or even by a recursive multiple equation model. The hypothesized relationships are bidirectional and contemporaneous, not solely lagged. The foreign policy of one actor is likely to react to the policies of the rival, and vice versa. A recursive model would allow only one rival to react without a lag. Furthermore, the accountability and credibility models predict that the public both leads and responds to foreign policy. A recursive model would necessitate contemporaneous and atheoretical zero restrictions on the response time of either public opinion or foreign policy. This raises three questions that we answer in the next two sections. First, is information available that allows us to systematically test the hypothesized accountability and credibility models versus the others? Second, even if we locate both relevant foreign policy and public opinion data, how can we empirically analyze these hypothesized nonrecursive structural models? And third, how do we analyze foreign policy and opinion dynamics in a model with contemporaneous effects?
Research Design

The Case
We analyze Israeli-Palestinian interactions as our test case since this protracted conflict is one of the most enduring of our time. Political scientists have studied this conflict for many years. Goldstein et al. (2001) find a complex set of behavioral relationships, including evidence of reciprocity between the two rivals as well as of ''triangularity'' in U.S. behavior toward the Israelis and Palestinians. Schrodt and Gerner (2004) report similar findings about triangularity. The role of the United States in this conflict is echoed in other quantitative works such as Organski and Lust-Okar (1997) and qualitative work such as Sirriyeh (1995) . Organski and LustOkar include the United States as a moderator, while Sirriyeh bases his qualitative forecasts for Israeli-Palestinian relations on U.S. intervention. These studies do not consider the possibilities of accountability or credibility. This is despite the fact that leaders such as Israel's Yitzhak Rabin commissioned polling data apparently to learn how best to build credibility at a crucial turning point in the conflict, during the secret negotiation of the Oslo Accords (Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000) . Existing studies thus cannot help sort out the competing theories discussed above. These rivals have somewhat different electoral histories: POLITY and Freedom House consider Israel to be a mature democracy. Since the first Oslo agreement, major efforts have been made to create a democratic Palestine (Brown 2003 
Data
Like Goldstein et al. (2001) and Schrodt and Gerner (2004) , we use events data to measure the directed behaviors of the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the United States. Events for directed behaviors among the United States, Israel, and the Palestine (World Event Interaction Survey coding) were extracted from KEDS from Agence France Presse news stories. Because this and other news sources do not distinguish the Palestinian Authority from Islamist groups, here we treat the Palestinians as a single actor. We acknowledge the challenges this decision presents for the interpretation of our results below. 9 The events are scaled with Goldstein scores and aggregated into monthly averages. 10 The variable mnemonics used to represent the directed behavior denote the governments of Israel, Palestine, and the United States by I, P, and A, respectively, so A2P t represents the level of conflict or cooperation directed by the United States toward the Palestinians at time t: Our sample is monthly from April 1996 to March 2005, and we reserve the remaining 2005 data for out-of-sample cross-validation.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict also provides a unique source of relevant public opinion data that allows an analysis of accountability and credibility relationships. Our public opinion measure is from polls conducted by the TSC. The TSC is an academic survey at Tel Aviv University. We use the TSC's peace index for Jewish respondents only. This index does not yield the kind of detailed insights about specific policies that were obtained from polls such as those that Rabin commissioned. But it provides a continuous sounding of the Israeli support for peace and assessments of the prospects for peace.
11 The Jewish peace index (JPI), denoted as JPI t , and the six event data series are shown in Figure 2 .
To capture coalitions, electoral forces, and trends in violence, nine exogenous dummy and trend variables are employed. Three variables for the identities of the Israeli prime ministers in each month are used (one each for Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharon, with Rabin or Peres treated as the reference category). For each of the four prime ministerial regimes, a separate time counter that starts at the value 1 in the month after each Israeli election and increases by one until the time of the next constitutionally mandated election (and is 0 otherwise) is used. These four trend variables capture electorally motivated cooperation and especially electorally motivated violence in the run-up to elections.
12 Finally, two dummy variables are included to capture changes in the trends of the mean level of conflict. The first is for the period from the start of the second Intifada to the start of the Battle of Jenin (October 2000 -April 2002 . The second is a dummy variable for the post-Battle of Brandt et al. / Reciprocity, Accountability, and Credibility 353 Jenin period (May 2002 -March 2005 . 13 Together, these absorb some of major increases and decreases in directed behavior between the Israelis and Palestinians.
Model
A structural Bayesian time series approach is used to evaluate the four theories in Table 1 . This approach addresses the problems of model scale, endogeneity, and specification uncertainty. The Web appendix describes the actual model, a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR). 14 A fuller explication of this model and explanation of its value in macro-political analyses can be found in Brandt and Freeman (2006, 2007) . The B-SVAR model has seven equations-six for the dyadic interactions for the Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States and one for the Jewish opinion about the peace process. Test statistics support using two lagged values of each of these seven endogenous variables. Each equation in the B-SVAR includes the nine exogenous variables described earlier.
3.3.1. Structural identification. The theories about reciprocity, accountability, and credibility can be represented as competing claims about the contemporaneous relationships among seven variables. The claims about contemporaneous relationships concern the speed of the response of some variables to shocks in others, especially about the immediate effects of shocks in Jewish opinion on directed behaviors of Israel and Palestine and the immediate reaction of Jewish opinion to these behaviors. Operationally, these claims are restrictions on the contemporaneous relationships in the model. The four theories all allow for the possibility of reciprocity and triangularity among the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the United States, but they differ in the zero restrictions they imply for the contemporaneous relationships for Jewish opinion.
Previous empirical models that purport to analyze reciprocity, accountability, and credibility relationships must account for these hypothesized two-way relationships. For comparison, we present a recursive structural model of the variables of interest in Table 2 . 15 The sets of seven rows each in Table 2 represent the contemporaneous relationships among the variables of interest. The distinct contemporaneous identification schemes are different A 0 matrices.
16 Table 2 rows correspond to the equations for the dyads or Jewish public opinion equation. The columns are the contemporaneous shocks that enter each equation. The Xs (or other letters) in the cells represent the ''free'' parameters to be estimated. The empty cells are zero restrictions. A zero restriction indicates no hypothesized contemporaneous relationship between a column variable residual and a given row equation. Note that in the recursive scheme all relationships above the diagonal are assumed to be zero. This implies that we have no expectation of any contemporaneous two-way relationships or that the errors propagate in a recursive chain through the equations. To the extent that there is a contemporaneous, within-month, for example, correlation between changes in one equation and another, that correlation is assigned by the recursive model in one direction only.
All four of the other models imply a constellation of zero restrictions and ''free'' parameters that make the matrix of contemporaneous relationships nonrecursive and overidentified. 17 Consider first the bystander model: this model allows for contemporaneous reciprocal and triangular relationships in directed behaviors and holds that the Israeli public does not react immediately to the behavior of its own government nor of the Palestinians and that none of the governments immediately Brandt et 356 Journal of Conflict Resolution react to changes in Jewish public opinion (as implied by the empty cells in the last column and the last row). The public does not pay attention to the behaviors of the three governments, and the three governments ignore changes in public opinion. The absence of contemporaneous relationships is represented as blanks or zeroorder restrictions.
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The other theories allow for other contemporaneous relationships, presented in the remaining three model blocks of Table 2. Note that they are nested: the follower model is implied by the accountability model, which itself is implied by the credibility model. The block of relationships for each model is thus similar to the bystander model for the contemporaneous reciprocal and triangular behaviors. The follower, accountability, and credibility models differ by allowing additional contemporaneous relationships. The F in the seventh row and first column of the follower block represents the possibility that Jewish citizens monitor and immediately react to the actions of their government toward the Palestinians but the Israeli government does not react to shifts in Jewish opinion. The As in the accountability block denote the possibilities that Jewish citizens immediately react to the actions of the Palestinians toward the Israelis and that their government immediately reacts to shifts in Jewish opinion. Finally, the theory that all these contemporaneous relationships exist and that (1) the Israeli, Palestinian, and American governments monitor and immediately react to shifts in Jewish opinion and (2) Jewish opinion immediately reacts to the directed behaviors of the Israelis and Palestinians is denoted by the Cs in the credibility block of Table 2 . Each of these blocks is the structural identification for one of the four B-SVAR models presented below.
3.3.2. Dynamics. The lagged relationships among the variables describe how changes in directed behavior and opinion are related through time. What distinguishes the B-SVAR model is that these relationships explicitly depend on the contemporaneous causal relationships. The responses of the system to unexpected changes in the endogenous variables or shocks, as revealed by an analysis of its reduced form, reflects both the lagged relationships and the (competing) restrictions on the contemporaneous relationships among the variables.
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Unlocking the dynamics of the system is difficult because of the problem of scale. The model contains a large number of parameters, and the parameter uncertainty makes it difficult to draw causal inferences and policy analysis. 20 To cope with model scale, we employ a modified version of the Sims and Zha prior (for details of this prior, see Sims and Zha 1998; Brandt and Freeman 2006, 2007) . 21 This prior is centered on a random walk model, allowing beliefs about degrees of persistence in behavior. 22 The prior puts low probability on nonzero values for the coefficients at the most distant (largest) lags. Rather than imposing exact (possibly incorrect) restrictions on these coefficients and, in effect, deleting lagged variables, the prior imposes a set of inexact restrictions on the lagged coefficients. These inexact restrictions are prior beliefs that many of the coefficients in the model-especially those Brandt et al. / Reciprocity, Accountability, and Credibility 357 for higher lags-have a prior mean of zero and small variances. The prior on the model coefficients is then correlated across equations in a way that depends on the contemporaneous relationships among the variables. This allows beliefs about the structure of the system to be included in the prior.
3.3.3. Model evaluation. Model scale also creates challenges for model evaluation because complex, highly parameterized models are bound to overfit the data, making conventional (frequentist) fit statistics less useful. The current Bayesian time series literature employs posterior probabilities to summarize models (Sargent, Williams, and Zha 2006; Sims and Zha 2006; Brandt and Freeman 2007) . The accountability, bystander, credibility, follower, and recursive models differ only in their structural identification specifications or A 0 matrices in Table 2 . The relevant quantity to compare across the models is then the probability of each contemporaneous specification, conditional on the data, the other parameters for the lagged effects, the lag length, and the hyperparameters. The items on which we condition the probability of the contemporaneous effects are the same across all of the models, so we collectively refer to this information as the Model. The quantity we use to compare the models is PrðA 0 |ModelÞ = PrðA 0 , ModelÞ PrðModelÞ , which is a standard conditional probability statement that can be computed from the posterior distribution. 23 We present these comparisons as log probabilities since this is a more numerically stable way to compute them.
Equally important, we analyze the dynamics of each model to see which produces the most plausible set of key impulse responses. Significantly, it is only with impulse-response analysis that we can track the sign of the dynamic changes and whether they are consistent with the theories. Using Bayesian methods provides meaningful error bands for these responses.
Finally, to assess the importance of public opinion dynamics in this rivalry system, two sets of out-of-sample forecasts from April to December 2005 were constructed. One set of forecasts includes the JPI series, while the other omits this series from the model. These forecasts are original in terms of their time span and because past studies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not been able to produce specific timing predictions. Our use of Bayesian methods allows us to produce meaningful error bands for these forecasts as well. Table 3 presents the posterior probabilities of the five different structural modelsrecursive, bystander, follower, accountability, and credibility. Moving down the rows of this table, each model contains more contemporaneous parameters (in its A 0 matrices), with the exception of the recursive model. The best-fitting model, with the largest log 358 Journal of Conflict Resolution probability, is the credibility model. The other column of Table 3 is the posterior probability. The probability of the credibility identification conditional on the data and the model is exp(−0.56) = 0.57, which is several orders in magnitude larger than the next best bystander model, exp(−2.29) = 0.10. The credibility model has much larger posterior odds when compared to the other four models: it is five to twenty-five times more likely than the other nonrecursive models. This is very strong evidence for the credibility model over the other contemporaneous specifications.
Model Fit and Selection
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The restrictions on the contemporaneous impacts of Jewish support for the peace process implied in the bystander, follower, and accountability models are not as likely as those in the credibility model. This means that conflict and public opinion dynamics are interconnected. Specifically, the Jewish public monitors and reacts to the behaviors of their government and/or the Palestinians, the Israeli government reacts to Jewish public opinion, and the Palestinians are sensitive to the constraints (opportunities) imposed (created) by Jewish public opinion.
Next, we look at the dynamics implied by the structure of the credibility model relative to its competitors. This helps us understand exactly how conflict and opinion dynamics are connected.
Impulse Responses
Impulse response analysis traces the response of the system of equations to shocks in selected variables and summarizes the complex dynamics of the system. The full set of impulse responses for the systems estimated here includes 245 responses (49 responses per model × 5 models). Rather than present all these responses, we focus on those of greatest substantive interest: the responses of I2P and P2I to surprise American interventions and to Jewish public opinion shocks and the responses of Jewish public opinion to cooperative shocks. These are the most theoretically relevant comparisons across the contemporaneous specifications in Table 2 .
Given correlated uncertainty about the dynamics responses in these models, the error bands for the impulse responses are computed using an eigenvector decomposition method (Brandt and Freeman 2006) . 26 The reported error bands are 68 percent (posterior) confidence regions around the median estimates. They provide a summary of the general trend and shape of the responses. The impulse responses presented here are for positive shocks to the system of equations. Positive shocks are chosen since they can naturally be interpreted as ''surprise'' movements toward peace or less conflict or increases in the support for the peace process. We begin with the way the two rivals respond to cooperative surprises by their adversaries. We show that in terms of the way they respond to unexpected cooperation at least, specifications as different as the bystander and credibility models produce similar dynamics. Figure 3 depicts the responses of the I2P, P2I, A2I, and A2P equations to shocks in the same variables. The rows in this figure are the responses of these equations to shocks in the column variables. 27 The bystander (credibility) model average Goldstein scaled responses and error bands are shown with solid (dashed) lines. Begin with the bystander model. The response on the average Goldstein scale of I2P to a positive shock in P2I is positive; the error bands for this response do not include zero. The bystander model thus implies reciprocity by the Israelis to surges of cooperation by the Palestinians. Now consider the second row of the figure for the bystander model. Again, the I2P is positive. Here, the response in P2I is briefly positive but soon turns negative. This is a belligerent response by the Palestinians to cooperative shocks by Israel.
Responses for the credibility model are similar. For the top row of Figure 3 for this model (dashed lines), the response of I2P to a positive shock in P2I is positive and is reciprocal. Row 2 shows that for this model a positive innovation in I2P also produces a clear, sustained inverse response in the average P2I. This finding that only the more democratic member of the conflict dyad reciprocates cooperation (and conflict) is consistent with the work of Guisinger and Smith (2002) and McGillivray and Smith (2000) , who suggest that democratic institutions create incentives for leaders to use reciprocal strategies. Conversely, their model implies that when the public finds it difficult to hold leaders accountable, elites may defect from cooperation. Thus, we expect to see a pattern of nondemocratic conflict in response to cooperative gestures from a rival. This ''tit-for-take-that'' behavior is consistent with an interpretation of Palestinian policy making that emphasizes the weakness of their central authority. Even for the data from before the 2006 Hamas election victory, the results show that when Israel cooperates, the Palestinian Authority fails to rein in militants who might attempt to scuttle the peace process. When Israel is hostile, the Palestinians cannot escalate in kind because of their lesser military capabilities. The reciprocal and nonreciprocal responses in Figure 3 do not directly demonstrate accountability. Accountability in the dynamic model presented here means that Jewish public opinion responds to unexpected changes in behavior by their government and the Palestinians (and vice versa). Figure 4 presents a comparison of the responses for the follower and credibility models that shows how the latter implies a much higher level of accountability. Figure 4 shows the responses of Jewish support for the peace process (JPI) to unexpected positive or cooperative one standard deviation shocks in Israeli actions toward the Palestinians and vice versa. The solid (dashed) lines are the responses from the follower (credibility) model. For the follower model, there is a small negative response, or an inverse public reaction to a surprise in average cooperation. For the credibility model response in Figure 4 , the mean response in JPI to a positive shock in I2P is more than five times as large as that of the follower model. The follower model allows only for a public reaction to rival behavior (I2P), while the credibility model also includes contemporaneous relationships between Jewish opinion and the behaviors of both belligerents. The reason for the different magnitudes of the responses is omitted endogeneity. In the credibility model that allows endogeneity between Jewish support for the peace process and conflict, the presence of accountability and credibility mechanisms generates a strong public opinion response to changes in the level of cooperation. The response is the opposite of what a follower model of public opinion would expect. Instead of echoing elite policy, public opinion constrains and reacts inversely to policy. This is consistent with the arguments of Wlezien (1996) , Eichenberg and Stoll (2003) , and Baumgartner and Jones (2005) .
The final component of the reciprocity-accountability-credibility causal linkage is the dynamic response of the Israelis and the Palestinians to unexpected changes in Jewish opinion about the peace process. If the Palestinian reaction to the Israelis (P2I) responds to shocks in public opinion (JPI), then this demonstrates credibility. A comparison of the responses of the accountability and credibility models best illustrates this important feature of the latter model. Figure 5 shows the accountability and credibility models' impulse responses for the I2P, P2I, A2I, and A2P equations for innovations in Jewish opinion. The main difference between the credibility model and the others is the impacts of surprise changes in JPI on the other equations in the system that represents triangularity, specifically the impacts of innovations in JPI on I2P, P2I, A2I, and A2P. In Figure 5 , the rows are the responses of the average Goldstein scaled I2P, P2I, A2I, and A2P equations to a surprise increase in Jewish support for the peace process. The comparison here is between a model allowing for contemporaneous political accountability (but not credibility) and a model allowing for both political accountability and cross-rival credibility.
The error bands for the response of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians to a positive innovation in JPI nearly include zero for the accountability model but not for the credibility model. For the accountability model, surprise increases in Jewish support for the peace process produce a short-term positive and then negative response in average Goldstein scaled P2I over twenty-four months. In contrast, for the credibility model, a positive innovation in JPI initially produces a strong negative response; the P2I response and its error bands are below zero and stay there over twenty-four months. Thus, a model that ignores the contemporaneous two-way relationship between opinion innovations and Palestinian actions produces a much different response: it misses the link between Jewish opinion and Palestinian policy toward Israel. For the credibility model-a specification where the instantaneous feedback between opinion and events is explicitly modeled-a cross-level (domestic to international) pattern of asymmetric interaction is evident. The Palestinians immediately react to public support for peace with conflict and opposition to peace with cooperation. This response, like the asymmetrical reciprocity finding discussed above (Figure 3 ), is that Palestinian actions counteract rather than reinforce changes in public opinion.
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Finally, note American reactions to the belligerents when Jewish support for the peace process increases. The U.S. response toward Israelis cools when Jewish support for the peace process increases; in contrast, U.S. reaction toward the Palestinians is initially negative but then rebounds and is cooperative. This latter reaction is slower and smaller in the credibility model. One explanation of this is that the United States reacts to what it perceives as actual or potential cooperation with Palestinian Islamist militants.
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In sum, the impulse response analysis illuminates the dynamic implication of the connections between rivalry and public opinion. Figures 3, 4, and 5 show what the credibility model implies about the interplay between conflict and opinion dynamics and how these implications markedly differ from those of other, less empirically powerful models of this conflict.
Forecasts
To further demonstrate that conflict dynamics are an outgrowth of opinion dynamics, we evaluate the forecasting performance of reduced-form models with and without our public opinion variable. For the model that includes JPI, the forecasts for Israeli and Palestinian dyadic actions (I2P and P2I) rapidly deteriorate over the course of nine months. The risk-based on the confidence region-places most of the posterior probability in the region of greatly increased conflict that matches the observed data. These forecasts are for some of the most severe conflict since the second Intifada. The forecasts for American actions show more cooperation toward the Israelis and less cooperation toward the Palestinians-a forecast that is borne out by a comparison to the actual data. The changes in Israeli and Palestinian actions toward the Americans change very little over the forecast period and are generally within the confidence regions of the forecasts.
The model that includes JPI forecasts a slight decrease in JPI over nine months. By December 2005, the forecasted mean level of JPI is 54, which is just below its historical sample mean of 57 (the standard deviation of JPI is 5.3). This downward trend in support of peace by the Israeli public is closely related to the trends in Israeli-Palestinian violence.
For the model omitting the JPI variable, the forecast performance is best described as ''poor'': the 68 percent confidence regions rarely cover the actual data. Furthermore, even the forecasted trends in the data are hard to discern. The actual series for the main series of interest-I2P and P2I-are outside the 68 percent forecast interval. Finally, the forecast errors for the I2P and P2I variables for the model including the Jewish public opinion data are much smaller: the forecast root mean square errors for the I2P and P2I series are 1.3 times smaller in the model that includes the JPI versus the model that excludes this variable (equation). This indicates the strong predictive capacity of the public opinion measure in this case and its general relevance to understanding and interpreting reciprocity, accountability, and credibility in the earlier structural models. Table 4 presents the root mean square forecast error for each equation in each model. There is a large improvement in the forecast error for I2P and P2I when JPI is included in the model because it reduces the forecast bias.
Conclusion
This article makes at least two contributions to the literature on rivals' conflict and cooperation. First, we demonstrate the complex interconnections between public opinion and intergroup conflict or cooperation and international mediation. Our results support the conclusion that Jewish public opinion is one key component in the system of conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. Our credibility model, allowing for simultaneous responses in and between foreign policy behavior and Jewish public opinion, provides the best fit to the data. Using this opinion series produces substantially more accurate forecasts of cooperation and conflict in this case. In the process, we show how Bayesian structural time series models allow us to relax the restrictive and atheoretical recursive assumptions previously used by scholars of international conflict. For example, event data analysts attempting to test reciprocity hypotheses premised their findings on unidirectional causality assumptions. Our theoretically informed models illuminate asymmetric reciprocity whereby the more democratic Israel reciprocates while Palestinians do not. Second, our results add support to the credibility model's well-developed micro foundations (Fearon 1994) . New experimental work on human subjects also supports the idea of audience costs, the key concept on which the credibility model rests (Tomz 2007) . This macro-dynamic analysis complements both lines of work since it supplies both a contemporaneous and a lagged temporal structure to the credibility processes, and it analyzes the behavior of actual belligerents in an important conflict. The impulse response and forecast analyses show how the credibility model can be used to perform substantively and theoretically useful counterfactual analyses as well as to produce early warnings. Of course, the Levant must be further studied. We need more fine-grained data that allow us to separate the Palestinian Authority from various Islamist militant groups. With these discrete series, we can employ similar, albeit more complex, Bayesian models to learn if the relationships we have illuminated apply to Israel's relations with these specific Palestinian groups and how these more specific relations depend on Jewish public opinion and vice versa. In this context, it is important to determine if some of the unexpected relationships we uncovered-for instance, the propensity of the United 14. This is available on the journal's Web site or from the first author. 15. Programs such as STATA and RATS default to a recursive ordering of variables when orthogonalized impulse response functions are calculated for a reduced form model, such as those in the current literature.
16. For more information on the model, see the appendix on the journal's Web site. 17. In this seven-equation (variable) model given the formulation of the Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR), there are at most twenty-eight free parameters in this matrix of coefficients, A 0 . All four models imply fewer than this number of free parameters, or more zero restrictions than are necessary to identify the model.
18. Of course, the data may not move the free coefficients denoted by the Xs off zero if there are no such relationships. But the zero-order restrictions impose zeros in the posterior for the coefficients denoted by blanks regardless of the information in the data.
19. If A + is the matrix of coefficients on lagged values of the variables in the structural model and A 0 is the matrix of coefficients for the contemporaneous relationships among the variables, then the reduced-form coefficients of the model are B = A + A −1 0 . 20. The weekly model of Goldstein et al. (2001, 607, n. 33 ) has twenty-four variables, each with nine lags. Thus, it has 217 coefficients per equation or more than 5,000 coefficients overall. Because of such scale, making meaningful causal inferences about the dynamic responses of their system will be difficult. For this reason, investigators usually do not even try to analyze dynamics, conduct innovation accounting, or produce forecasts. There is good reason to believe that most of the coefficients for the high-frequency dynamics in their model are close to zero.
21. The hyperparameter values for the Sims-Zha prior were set at values based on experience with events data and discussions with leading international relations scholars such as Philip Schrodt (2006; Brandt and Freeman 2006) . The hyperparameter values used in all four models were l 0 = 0:8, l 1 = 0:1, l 2 = 1, l 3 = 1, l 4 = 0:1, l 5 = 0:05, m 5 = 0, m 6 = 5: Other values yield qualitatively similar results and inferences to those reported here. These results are available from the authors.
22. This prior serves as a benchmark and does not mean that the data follow random walks. If it is inconsistent with the data, the estimated posterior will reflect this.
23. The numerator here is the likelihood multiplied by the prior distribution, and the denominator is the marginal data density multiplied by the posterior probability of the common noncontemporaneous parameters in the model. It is important when estimating these probabilities to assess the sensitivity of the results to the prior specification for each model. In the present case, the posterior is insensitive to the choice of the prior hyperparameters. Also, the results are similar across two independent posterior sample chains for each model. 24. Many existing forecasting methods suffer from ''off-on-timing'' problems. An example is the expected utility approach (Bueno de Mesquita 1997). The respective model can have timing elements incorporated in it, but the expected utility model tells us only if a particular decision is likely to be made after a short or long series of deliberations; ''it cannot say how long in clock-time a round of negotiations will last'' (Bueno de Mesquita 1997, 264) . Measures of forecast uncertainty (error bands) are absent, for example, in the work of the Political Risk Service, in the work of the International Crisis Group, and in more sophisticated analyses using hidden Markov models (Schrodt 2006; Schrodt and Gerner 2000) .
25. We also ran models that (1) excluded the exogenous control variables from the B-SVAR models and (2) included more lags of the endogenous variables. These models produce the same inference, namely, that the credibility model is superior to the other specifications.
26. The eigenvector decomposition of the variance of the impulse responses decomposes the variation of the responses over time. This is a better summary of the overall shape, skewness, and location of the error bands since it accounts for the correlation in the responses. The variation explained by the first Brandt et al. / Reciprocity, Accountability, and Credibility 371 eigenvector of each response is between 65 percent and 100 percent of the variation in the impulse responses (for details, see Brandt and Freeman 2006) . 27. These are one standard deviation shocks of the residuals from the respective equation in the B-SVAR model.
28. It is important to reiterate that because of the way news sources report events in the Middle East, we combine the Palestinian Authority and Islamist militant groups in the same measure. Our results therefore could be more indicative of the way that the Islamist groups respond to unexpected cooperation toward the Palestinians by the Israelis than by the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. The use of average Goldstein scores rather than total Goldstein scores appears to not be responsible for the results. The analysis for total scores yields the same inverse response of P2I to shocks in I2P.
29. Once more this response of P2I may be more indicative of the Islamist militant groups of which the variable is composed than of the actions of the Palestinian Authority.
30. Another explanation is that in this period, despite its rhetoric, American administrations were not supportive of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
31. One could do this exercise with the B-SVAR rather than the Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) models. The results will be the same since the B-SVAR version just decomposes the reducedform residuals of the BVAR. This decomposition is critical for the earlier model selection and interpretation of the impulse responses. Forecasting, however, is a reduced form exercise and is invariant to structural specifications.
32. The election counters and dummies continue forward just as they would if we coded the data through December 2005. The Kadima and Hamas election victories come in January 2006 and thus are outside our forecasting window.
33. These data were not used in the estimation, so this exercise serves as a cross-validation of our BVAR models.
